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ABSTRACT
Economic theory predicts that home ownership should generally have a negative effect on risk-taking
in financial portfolios, a result that affects the optimal design of a wide variety of financial and insurance
policies. However, empirical work has not found a strong relationship between housing and portfolios.
We identify two reasons for the divergence between the theory and data. First, it is critical to distinguish
between home equity wealth and mortgage debt, as they have opposite-signed effects on portfolio
choice. Second, it is important to isolate variation in home equity wealth and mortgage debt that is
orthogonal to unobserved determinants of portfolios. We estimate a model that permits home equity
wealth and mortgage debt to have different effects on portfolio shares. We isolate plausibly exogenous
variation in home equity and mortgages by using differences across housing markets in average house
prices and housing supply elasticities as instruments. Using data for 60,000 households, we find that
increases in mortgage debt reduce stockholding significantly, while increases in home equity wealth
raise stockholding. On net, an individual with 10% more mortgage debt and home equity has a 3%
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Houses are the largest assets owned by most households, but the impact of housing on ￿nancial
markets remains unclear. Theory predicts that housing generally reduces the demand for
risky assets because it increases a household￿ s exposure to risk and illiquidity (Grossman and
Laroque 1990, Brueckner 1997, Flavin and Yamashita 2002, Chetty and Szeidl 2007). But
empirical studies have not found a systematic relationship between housing and portfolios in
practice (Fratantoni 1998, Heaton and Lucas 2000, Yamashita 2003, Cocco 2005).
This paper reconciles the theory with the data. We identify two key factors, one theoret-
ical and one empirical, that explain the discrepancy. Theoretically, we show that it is critical
to separate the e⁄ects of mortgage debt from the e⁄ects of home equity to characterize the
e⁄ects of housing on portfolios. Empirically, we show that the endogeneity of housing choice
biases prior estimates. Accounting for these two factors, we ￿nd that increases in mortgage
debt induce substantial reductions in the share of liquid wealth held in stocks, while increases
in home equity wealth raise stock ownership.
We structure our empirical analysis using an analytically tractable model of portfolio
choice that incorporates both the illiquidity and price risk e⁄ects of housing. The model
predicts that mortgage debt and home equity wealth have opposite-signed e⁄ects on portfolio
choice. Increases in property value (holding wealth ￿xed) generally reduce the stock share of
liquid wealth by increasing illiquidity, increasing exposure to risk, and reducing the present
value of lifetime wealth. Increases in home equity raise the stock share of liquid wealth
with CRRA preferences through a wealth e⁄ect, as emphasized by Yao and Zhang (2005).
Because property value is the sum of mortgage debt and home equity, changes in property
value conditional on the level of home equity are equivalent to changes in mortgage debt
and should reduce stockholding. However, a regression of portfolio shares on property value
that does not fully control for wealth ￿as in prior empirical studies ￿may yield ambiguous
estimates because the variation in property values could be driven by an increase in home
equity.
Because both portfolios and housing are endogenous choices that are a⁄ected by unob-
served factors such as background risk (Campbell and Cocco 2003, Cocco 2005), one cannot
identify the causal e⁄ect of housing on portfolios using cross-sectional variation across house-
holds. We use three research designs to address this central endogeneity problem. Each
1strategy isolates variation in mortgage debt and home equity that is orthogonal to unob-
served determinants of portfolio choice under a di⁄erent set of assumptions.
Our ￿rst research design instruments for property values and home equity using current
and year-of-purchase home prices in the individual￿ s state, calculated using repeat-sales in-
dices. The current house price index is naturally a strong predictor of property values.
However, the current house price also creates variation in a household￿ s wealth: increases in
house prices increase home equity wealth. To isolate the causal e⁄ect of a more expensive
house while holding wealth ￿xed, we exploit the second instrument ￿the average house price
at the time of purchase. Individuals who purchase houses at a point when prices are high
tend to have less home equity and a larger mortgage. We control for aggregate shocks and
cross-sectional di⁄erences across housing markets by including state and year ￿xed e⁄ects,
thereby exploiting only di⁄erential within-state variation for identi￿cation.
We implement this cross-sectional IV strategy using microdata on housing and portfolios
for 64,191 households from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panels
spanning 1990 to 2004. We use two-stage-least-squares speci￿cations to estimate the e⁄ect of
property value and home equity on the share of liquid wealth that a household holds in stocks.
We ￿nd that housing has a large e⁄ect on the share of stockholdings. A $10,000 increase
in property value (holding ￿xed home equity wealth) causes the stock share of liquid wealth
to fall by $310, or 5.5% of mean stockholdings in the sample. This estimate is stable and
statistically signi￿cant with p < 0:05 across a broad range of speci￿cations. In contrast, a
$10,000 increase in home equity (holding ￿xed total property value) increases the stock share
of liquid wealth by 5.9% through a wealth e⁄ect.1 The elasticity of the stock share of liquid
wealth with respect to outstanding mortgage debt is -0.3, while the elasticity with respect
to home equity wealth is 0.4. These portfolio changes are driven by both the extensive
and intensive margins: changes in mortgage debt and home equity wealth induces changes
in both the probability of owning any stocks and the amount of stocks held conditional on
stock ownership.
One potential concern with our ￿rst research design is that state-level house price ￿ uc-
tuations may be correlated with other factors such as local labor market conditions that
1To facilitate comparison between samples with di⁄erent rates of stock market participation and hence
di⁄erent mean stock shares of liquid wealth, we report results in percentages, rather than percentage points.
2directly impact portfolio choice. Our second research design addresses this concern. Here,
we instrument for property values and home equity using the current and year-of-purchase
national average of house prices interacted with the state housing supply elasticity, as mea-
sured by Saiz (2010) based on land availability and regulations. Intuitively, ￿ uctuations in
the national housing market generate larger price ￿ uctuations in states with inelastic housing
supply, generating di⁄erential variation in house prices across states over time. This strategy
yields estimates that are very similar to the ￿rst design. We estimate that a $10,000 increase
in property value causes a reduction in the stock share of liquid wealth of approximately
5.1%, while a $10,000 increase in home equity (holding ￿xed total property value) raises the
stock share by 4.7%.
Our third research design uses panel data to study the short-run dynamics of portfolios
from the year before to the year after home purchase. We test whether individuals who buy
a larger house reduce their stock share of liquid wealth more than those who buy smaller
houses. We again instrument for the change in property value using the state-level house price
index at the time of home purchase. This panel strategy complements the cross-sectional
approaches in two ways. First, it provides evidence that households actively change the
composition of their ￿nancial portfolios depending upon the amount they invest in a house.
Second, it further mitigates concerns about the endogeneity of housing choices by permitting
household ￿xed e⁄ects. Because the SIPP is a short panel, we observe portfolio shares both
before and after home purchase for only 6,510 households. For this subset of households, we
￿nd that a $10,000 increase in the price of the house leads to a 4.1% reduction in the stock
share of liquid wealth in the year after home purchase, again very similar to the estimates
from the ￿rst two designs. This ￿nding shows that stockholders primarily sell stocks (rather
than bonds) to ￿nance down payments.
The magnitudes of the impact of housing on ￿nancial portfolios can be assessed by consid-
ering various counterfactuals. First, suppose households had the same level of home equity
wealth but had their mortgage debt obligations cancelled. Our estimates from our the ￿rst
research design imply that the stock share of portfolios would be 4.3 percentage points higher
in this scenario. Given a mean level of liquid wealth in our sample of $40,000 (in 1990
dollars), this translates into a $1,700 increase in stockholdings per household in the sample.
While this may appear to be a small change in absolute terms, it constitutes a 27% increase
3in the stock share of liquid wealth relative to the sample mean. Second, suppose households
had no mortgage debt and no home equity wealth. The net impact of having no housing
wealth or liabilities would be an increase in the stock share of 5.2 percentage points (32%),
or $2,100. Finally, as another metric, a one standard deviation increase in mortgage debt
reduces the stock share of liquid wealth by 4 percentage points (25%). This is similar to the
impact of a one standard deviation increase in log ￿nancial wealth on stock shares (Calvet,
Campbell, and Sodini 2007). The magnitudes of these impacts are also consistent with
numerical simulations of our model when calibrated with parameters used in the literature.
Our estimates of the e⁄ect of housing on portfolios are larger and more robust than pre-
vious estimates. Fratantoni (1998) ￿nds an elasticity of stock share with respect to mortgage
debt of -0.15. In contrast, Heaton and Lucas (2000), Cocco (2005), and Yao and Zhang
(2005) show that when property value is included as a covariate, mortgages are positively
associated with the stock share in cross-sectional OLS regressions. Yamashita (2003) ￿nds
an elasticity of stock share with respect to property value of approximately -0.1 in a speci￿-
cation that does not include mortgage debt. Yamashita uses age, family size, home tenure,
and aggregate housing returns as instruments for mortgage debt; unfortunately, these instru-
ments are unlikely to be valid because standard models (e.g. Cocco 2005) generate direct
relationships between all of these variables and portfolio choice, independent of the housing
channel. Consistent with these prior studies, we also ￿nd that OLS estimates in our data
are often wrong-signed and are sensitive to covariates. Our IV estimates are less sensitive to
speci￿cation because they are driven by variation that is orthogonal to most household-level
determinants of portfolios and because we systematically separate the e⁄ects of mortgage
debt and home equity.
The link between housing and ￿nancial decisions that we document here has implications
for several issues. For example, our results suggest that recent increases in leverage due
to the easing of credit in the U.S. (Mian and Su￿ 2011) may have induced households to
withdraw funds from the stock market. This reduction in demand for risky assets could
have further precipitated the sharp decline in asset prices. Our results also support the view
that homeownership ampli￿es the welfare cost of shocks. Policies such as unemployment and
health insurance or restrictions on the riskiness of ￿nancial portfolios could therefore generate
signi￿cant welfare gains for individuals who own houses or other risky, illiquid assets.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a portfolio
choice model, analyzes its comparative statics with respect to housing, and quanti￿es the
impacts one should expect using numerical simulations. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we characterize the forces through which exogenous changes in property value
and home equity a⁄ect household portfolios. We begin by deriving an approximate analytical
expression for optimal portfolio shares in a stylized two-period model. This stylized model
provides a simple, tractable framework that uni￿es the intuitions of several papers that have
highlighted di⁄erent mechanisms through which housing a⁄ects portfolio choice, including
illiquidity (Grossman and Laroque 1990, Chetty and Szeidl 2007), home price risk (Flavin
and Yamashita 2002), hedging e⁄ects (Sinai and Souleles 2005), and diversi￿cation e⁄ects
(Yao and Zhang 2005). We then generalize the model to allow for ￿xed moving costs,
multiple periods, and labor income risk. Using numerical simulations, we show that the
key comparative statics of the two-period model hold with plausible parametrizations in this
more general environment.
2.1 Stylized Two-Period Model
Our stylized model builds on Cocco￿ s (2005) model of housing and portfolio choice, which
incorporates all of the mechanisms described above but does not permit an analytical solu-
tion. To obtain an analytic expression for portfolio shares, we make a number of simplifying
assumptions, most importantly that households can only move at exogenous random dates.
The more realistic model in which households can move by paying a ￿xed cost is analytically
intractible, and we therefore analyze it using numerical simulations below.
A household endowed with a house H0, mortgage debt M0, and liquid wealth L0 makes












where C1 is adjustable (e.g., food) consumption and H1 is housing consumption. As in
5Campbell and Cocco (2003), we assume that moves in t = 1 are exogenous. With probability
￿ the household stays in the current house (H1 = H0), while with probability 1￿￿ it moves,
and chooses H1 optimally. One interpretation of this assumption is that the ￿xed cost of
moving is su¢ ciently high that except for life-changing events, such as marriage or childbirth,
the household does not consider changing houses when making ￿nancial investments. In this
model, ￿ measures the strength of housing commitment.
At t = 0 the household can invest in a riskfree ￿nancial asset with return 1+Rf = exp(rf)
and a risky asset with return 1+R = exp(r), where r is normally distributed with mean ￿ and
variance ￿2. The only choice variable at t = 0 is ￿, the share of the risky asset out of liquid
wealth. Let Rp = ￿R+(1 ￿ ￿)Rf denote the household￿ s ￿nancial return, and assume that
short sales constraints restrict ￿ 2 [0;1]. Home prices are P0 = 1 and P1 = exp(p1), where
p1 is normal with mean ￿p and variance ￿2
p. The correlation between home price growth and
stock returns is ￿ = corr[p1;r].
The household chooses ￿ to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint
C1 + P1H1 = (1 + Rp)L0 + Y1 + P1H0 ￿ (1 + Rm)M0
where Rm is the mortgage rate and Y1 is labor income, which for now we assume is deter-
ministic. Let the present values of mortgage debt, labor income, liquid wealth, home value,
and lifetime wealth be denoted by M = M0 (1 + Rm)=(1 + Rf), Y = Y1=(1 + Rf), L = L0,
PH = P0H0 ￿ e￿p=(1 + Rf), and W = L + Y + PH ￿ M.2
Optimal portfolio shares. We derive an approximate equation for the optimal risk share ￿
using log-linearization. Household optimization yields the following log-linear Euler equation:
Er ￿ rf +
￿2
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m are the log marginal utilities of wealth in t = 1 in the ￿no move￿and








2With the exception of housing, these measures are risk-adjusted present values. For housing, our de￿ntion
does not account for house price risk but turns out to be suitable for the log-linearization approach used below.
6Intuitively, the agent optimizes by trading o⁄ the expected gain from investing in the risky
asset with the additional ￿ uctuation in marginal utilities he bears as a result of the investment.
The additional risk is measured by the covariance of the market return with marginal utilities,
weighted by ￿￿. The weight ￿￿ can be interpreted as a marginal-utility-adjusted probability
of not moving, analogous to a state-price density. When the housing share of lifetime wealth
PH=W equals the optimal share ￿, ￿￿ = ￿. But when PH=W > ￿, ￿￿ > ￿: since the
household starts with too much housing and too little adjustable consumption, the marginal
utility of wealth is￿ on average￿ relatively higher in the no-move state. As a result, the
consumer is more sensitive to ￿ uctuations in this state, explaining the larger weight ￿￿.
The optimal portfolio share can be derived from the Euler equation using standard meth-
ods (see e.g., Campbell and Viceira 2002):
Proposition 1 Letting ￿c = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿, the optimal share of stocks out of liquid wealth at
t = 0 is, to a log-linear approximation,
￿ =




W￿PH + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ L
W
i + cov[p1;r] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)










To understand this expression, ￿rst consider the case in which house prices do not covary
with stock prices (cov[p1;r] = 0). In this case, the second term drops out and (3) has an
interpretation analogous to a familiar ￿myopic￿rule: the numerator measures the expected
excess return of stocks, while the denominator equals stock market risk ￿2 multiplied by
e⁄ective risk aversion over liquid wealth. Because housing is a ￿xed commitment, risk
aversion is the weighted average ￿￿￿cL=(W ￿ PH)+(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿(L=W). When the consumer
is free to move (￿ = ￿￿ = 0), this term simpli￿es to ￿L=W, yielding the classic Merton (1969)
formula adjusted for the fact that stocks are measured as a share of liquid rather than total
wealth. When the consumer can never adjust housing (￿ = ￿￿ = 1), e⁄ective risk aversion
is ￿cL=(W ￿ PH). E⁄ective risk aversion di⁄ers when the agent does not move for two
reasons. First, because shocks are concentrated on adjustable consumption W ￿ PH, they
have an ampli￿ed e⁄ect on marginal utility (Chetty and Szeidl 2007). Second, because H1
does not adjust, curvature is determined by (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) in (1), generating the ￿c term.
7When cov[p1;r] 6= 0, home price risk generates a hedging demand for stocks, re￿ ected in the
second term in (3). This term is also a⁄ected by the strength of the housing commitment ￿
through ￿￿. When ￿ = ￿￿ = 1, the home is never sold, and hence home price risk does not
a⁄ect behavior (Sinai and Souleles 2005).
Comparative Statics. We are interested in characterizing how the optimal portfolio share
varies with property value PH and total wealth W. With CRRA utility, the household seeks
to maintain a constant share of its total wealth in risky assets as W rises. Therefore, an
exogenous increase in home equity wealth ￿which is relatively safe ￿induces the household
to buy more stocks. This ￿diversi￿cation e⁄ect￿(Yao and Zhang 2005) is captured by the
terms involving W in the denominator in (3). In our model, an increase in wealth also
reduces ￿￿, the weight of the no-move state in the Euler equation. Because the no-move
state is typically riskier, this additional e⁄ect generally acts to further raise ￿￿.
Exogenous increases in property value PH reduce ￿￿ through three channels. First, for a
given W, increasing PH implies that a larger share of wealth is ￿tied up￿in housing, making
marginal utility higher and more sensitive to shocks in the no-move state. This e⁄ect arises
from an increase in e⁄ective risk aversion ￿cL=(W ￿ PH) in the denominator of (3) and by
a higher weight ￿￿ on the no-move state. Second, when cov[p1;r] > 0, a higher PH results in
greater exposure to home price risk, which has a negative e⁄ect on hedging demand. Third,
holding ￿xed home equity, a higher property value means higher mortgage debt. If the
mortgage rate exceeds the risk free rate (Rm > Rf), increased mortgage payments reduce
lifetime wealth W, resulting in lower stockholdings in (3).
These comparative statics show that it is critical to distinguish changes in property value
from changes in home equity wealth to uncover the e⁄ects of housing on portfolio choice.
Increases in property value that come from more mortgage debt reduce stockholding, while
increases in property value that are accompanied by additional home equity wealth have
ambiguous e⁄ects.
2.2 Numerical Simulations
We now assess the quantitative importance of the comparative statics as well as their ro-
bustness to incorporating the following features: (1) ￿xed adjustment costs, which permit
households to move at any time by paying a cost, (2) multi-period dynamics with persistent
8uncertainty, (3) labor income risk, and (4) prepayment and re￿nancing of mortgages. Be-
cause these features make the model analytically intractable, we use numerical simulations
to characterize the relationship between housing and portfolios.3
We begin by calibrating the parameters of the model based on the existing literature.
For parameters related to life-cycle portfolio choice, we follow Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
(2005) and set the annual riskfree return at Rf = 0:02, the annual equity premium at ER ￿
Rf = 0:04, the standard deviation of the log stock return at ￿ = 0:157, and the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion at ￿ = 10. For housing related parameters, we set the relative preference
for housing at ￿ = 0:2 (Yao and Zhang 2005) and the annual standard deviation of home
prices at ￿p = 0:062 and the annual mortgage rate at Rm = 0:04 (Cocco 2005). Cocco and
Yao and Zhang assume a zero correlation between housing and the stock market; we report
results both with ￿ = 0 and with ￿ = 0:1 here.
In our baseline case, we consider a ten year investment horizon, chosen to re￿ ect the
average age in our sample of 48 years. We also report results from simulations with a twenty
year investment horizon. Cocco (2005) estimates a moving probability of 24.4% over a ￿ve
year horizon, which implies that the probability a household does not move over a ten year
horizon is about 57%. We therefore set a baseline ￿ = 0:55, but evaluate the sensitivity
of our results to other values as well. We assume that the household has liquid wealth
L0 = $40;000, home value P0H0 = $125;000 and mortgage M0 = $53;000, the sample means
in our data. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005, Figure 3b) report that the ratio of the
risk-adjusted present value of future labor income to current ￿nancial wealth is about 5 for
households in their late forties and early ￿fties. We therefore set labor income at Y1 = 5L0.
Simulations of stylized model. We ￿rst report numerical simulations of the stylized two-
period model as a reference to verify that the approximate solution in (3) accurately captures
the comparative statics of the model.4 Table 1 reports optimal portfolios as a function of
property value and home equity for a range of model parameters. Panel A con￿rms that
increases in property value P0H0 (holding ￿xed home equity wealth) reduce the optimal share
3Details on the simulations methods are given in the appendix. We thank Joao Cocco for sharing his code
for solving the model in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
4The quality of the approximation is quite high for short horizon but deteriorates over longer horizons.
For example, the average absolute di⁄erence between the numerical and the approximate solution across all
the parameter values considered in Table 1 is only 0.55 percentage points for a one year horizon. With a ￿ve
year horizon, the mean error grows to 2.07 percentage points and for ten years it is 2.98 percentage points.
Despite these deviations, the approximate solution shows the same patterns as the numerical results.
9of stocks. For example, when the probability that the household does not move is ￿ = 0:55
and housing is uncorrelated with returns (￿ = 0), increasing property value from $125;000 to
$135;000 results in a reduction in stock share from 66:5% to 60:1%, or by about 9:6%.5 Panel
B considers the e⁄ect of changes in home equity wealth. In the baseline case, an increase in
home equity from $72;000 to $82;000, while holding home value ￿xed at $125;000, increases
the stock share from 66:5% to 72:7%, or by about 9:3%. We observe qualitatively similar
e⁄ects for other parameter values. Having established the comparative statics of interest in
our stylized model, we now consider a series of generalizations.
Fixed adjustment costs. We begin by relaxing the assumption that households can only
move at random, exogenous dates. A more realistic assumption is that households can move
at any time by paying a ￿xed cost. Let ￿ denote the size of this ￿xed cost as a share of
property value. Smith, Rosen, and Fallis (1988) estimate the monetary component of moving
costs to be approximately ￿ = 0:1. We consider values of ￿ = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:2, the latter of
which captures other utility costs of moves (e.g., the need to change a child￿ s school). Panel
A of Table 2 reports simulations analogous to those in Table 1 from this model. The direction
of comparative statics are generally the same, but the property value e⁄ects are smaller in
magnitude, as should be expected given that housing is a weaker commitment in this model.
In the ￿xed cost model, the comparative statics of interest actually change sign for some
parameter values. For instance, when ￿ = 0:2, increasing home value from $105;000
to $115;000 reduces the stock share from 84:9% to 82:6%, but an additional increase in
home value to $125;000 actually increases the stock share slightly, to 82:8%. Such non-
monotonicities in risk preferences in the presence of ￿xed costs were ￿rst observed by Gross-
man and Laroque (1990) and more extensively documented by Yao and Zhang (2005). The
intuition is that households who are relatively close to the boundary of their inaction region
have a gambling motive: by holding more stocks, they can increase the probability of buying
their ￿ideal￿house. For households who are on the margin of moving, this mechanism can
5Our calibrated model produces stock shares that are substantially higher than the mean stock share
of liquid wealth in our data (16%). The model matches the data better if we focus on the subsample
of stockholders, among whom the average stock share is 55%. As Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005)
and Davis, Kubler and Willen (2006) emphasize, calibrated models of portfolio choice frequently overpredict
stockholdings because relatively safe future labor income creates an incentive to leverage ￿nancial investment.
The discrepancy between the model and the data in levels could be addressed by allowing for ￿xed costs of
participating in asset markets, which make a large subset of households choose not to participate (Vissing-
Jorgensen 2002).
10sometimes overpower the three forces that act toward reducing ￿￿. However, Table 2 shows
that for most parameter values, the other three forces dominate. Therefore, given a plausible
distribution of wealth and housing values in the population, we expect the average e⁄ect of
property value on the stock share of liquid wealth to be negative.
Persistent uncertainty. Our stylized model is e⁄ectively static, because all uncertainty is
resolved in a single period. To consider the e⁄ects of persistent uncertainty, we now introduce
a third period into the baseline model. In t = 0, the household makes a portfolio decision
as above. In t = 1, it repays its outstanding mortgage, earns labor income Y1, moves houses
with (exogenous) probability (1 ￿ ￿), consumes, and makes a new portfolio decision. In
t = 2, the household earns labor income Y2, moves with independent probability (1 ￿ ￿), and
consumes. We assume that each period lasts ten years. We set Y1 = 4L0, Y2 = 3L0, and set
the remaining parameters to the value above, with an annual discount factor of ￿ = 0:96.6
Panel B of Table 2 shows that in this environment with persistent uncertainty, the e⁄ects
of property value and home equity are similar to the baseline speci￿cation, but larger in
magnitude.
Income risk. A third simpli￿cation in our baseline model is the absence of labor income
risk. To account for income risk, we follow Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) and introduce
a shock which occurs with probability of 5% per period and results in a loss of 20% of labor
income.7 As Panel C of Table 2 shows, introducing these shocks reduces the stock share of
portfolios. This is because these shocks reduce expected lifetime wealth and because they
increase risk aversion. However, the predictions about the e⁄ect of property value and home
equity are again unchanged in sign and remain relatively similar in magnitude.
Prepayment and re￿nancing. A ￿nal simpli￿cation in the baseline model is that mortgage
payment is exogenous. In practice, mortgages can be pre-paid, raising the question of why
households save in the form of liquid stocks and bonds while also holding mortgage debt. One
natural reason emphasized by Campbell and Cocco (2003) is that borrowing costs, such as
costs of re￿nance, generate a motive to hold a bu⁄er stock in liquid assets. One simple way to
model such costs of short term borrowing is to assume that adjustable consumption C1 must
6We introduce a discount factor only here because in the baseline model, utility is obtained in a single
period, and hence discounting has no e⁄ect on behavior.
7One can derive an approximate analytic formula for this case with income risk, but in the interest of space
we do not pursue this approach here.
11be ￿nanced from a share ￿ of labor income Y1. Here ￿Y1 can be interpreted as labor income
which accumulates before consumption, or which can be borrowed against. To see the e⁄ect
of this constraint, note that in the no move state, optimal consumption is C￿
1 = L1+Y1￿M1,
while borrowing limits impose C1 ￿ L1+￿Y1. Thus, whenever M1 < (1 ￿ ￿)Y1 the constraint
is binding. In this case, holding mortgage debt is useful because it substitutes for borrowing
against future labor income. Using this insight, it can be shown that for a range of ￿ < 1
and ￿ > 0, optimal mortgage debt is M0 = (1 ￿ ￿)Y1/(1 + Rm) > 0 and that, given this M0,
the optimal portfolio coincides with the solution of our baseline model.
Across the model speci￿cations, the e⁄ect of a $10,000 increase in property value ranges
from an average reduction in the stock share of about 2.5 percent in the ￿xed adjustment
cost model to an average reduction of about 20 percent in the model with exogenous random
moves and persistent uncertainty. The average e⁄ect of a $10,000 increase in home equity
wealth ranges from an increase of 5-23 percent in stock shares. While the simulations show
that mortgage debt generally reduces risk taking in ￿nancial portfolios and home equity
wealth increases it, the magnitudes of these e⁄ects are sensitive to model speci￿cation. The
quantitative impacts of housing on portfolio choice are therefore an empirical question, to
which we now turn.
3 Data and Sample De￿nition
We estimate equation (4) using data from seven Survey of Income and Program Participation
panels that began in years 1990-2001. Each SIPP panel tracks 20,000 to 30,000 households
over a period of 2-3 years, collecting information on income, assets, and demographics. Dur-
ing the ￿rst four panels, asset data were only collected once; in the last three panels, asset
data were collected once per year, permitting a panel analysis of changes in portfolios. The
main advantages of the SIPP relative to other commonly used datasets on ￿nancial char-
acteristics such as the Survey of Consumer Finances are its large sample size and detailed
information about covariates such a complete housing history and geographic location.
We obtain quarterly data on average of housing prices by state from 1975-2004 using
the repeat sales index constructed by the O¢ ce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO). Calhoun (1996) provides a detailed description of the construction of the OFHEO
index, which has been widely used in studies of housing markets (see e.g., Himmelberg, Mayer,
12and Sinai 2005).8 We obtain land topology-based measures of housing supply elasticity
by state from Saiz (2010, Table 6). Saiz predicts housing supply elasticities using data
on physical and regulatory constraints (land availability and use regulations), providing a
convenient index of the supply constraints in each housing market.
The seven SIPP panels together contain information on 163,405 unique households, of
which 97,798 are homeowners.9 70,924 of these households bought their current house after
1975 and therefore have OFHEO data for the year of home purchase, which is required for our
instrumental variable analysis. We exclude an additional 6,733 households whose reported
liquid wealth by our de￿nition is zero, making their portfolio shares ill de￿ned. These
exclusions leave us with 64,191 homeowners in our cross-sectional analysis sample.
Table 3a reports summary statistics for the cross-sectional analysis sample. In the cross-
sectional sample, homeowners own houses that are worth approximately $125,000 on average
in 1990 dollars. The average amount of home equity is $72,000 and the average outstanding
mortgage is $53,000. The average household head is 48 years old and has lived in his current
house for 8.4 years. Mean total wealth (which includes liquid wealth, home equity, and other
illiquid assets such as cars) is $173,000.10 We de￿ne liquid wealth as the sum of assets held in
stocks, bonds, checking, and savings accounts (excluding retirement accounts). Mean liquid
wealth is $40,000, but this distribution is very skewed; the median level of liquid wealth is only
$5,600.11 Households hold on average approximately 16% of their liquid wealth in the form
of stocks in taxable (non-retirement) accounts and 84% in ￿safe￿ assets (bonds, checking,
and savings accounts). The relatively small fraction of wealth held in stocks re￿ ects the fact
that only 29% of the households in the data hold stocks outside their retirement accounts,
consistent with Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
8We use OFHEO price indices rather than other popular measures such as Case-Shiller indices because
Case-Shiller data are available only starting in 2000 for selected metro areas. Unfortunately, geographic
information below the state level is not available for more than two-thirds of the observations in our sample.
Although the two indices di⁄er in the way they treat appraisals and the set of loans they consider, Leventis
(2007) reports a correlation of 0.98 between the OFHEO and Case-Shiller indices for markets where both
measures are available.
9See Appendix Table 1 for summary statistics for the full SIPP sample.
10Total wealth is gross household wealth measured on the survey. It includes ￿nancial assets as well as all
real estate (including second homes), cars, and private business equity. Debts are not subtracted from the
total wealth measure.
11Skewness and outliers do not a⁄ect the results reported below. Trimming outliers (e.g. by excluding the
top and bottom 1% of households by wealth or property value) has virtually no e⁄ect on our 2SLS estimates.
This is because the distribution of predicted housing values generated by the instruments is not skewed. There
are few outliers in the ￿tted values from the ￿rst stage.
13Panel data on portfolio shares are available for households in the 1996 and 2001 SIPP
panels. In these panels, data on portfolio shares were collected annually, giving us information
on assets and homeownership between 3 to 4 times per household. We form our panel analysis
sample using the 6,150 observations for which we observe a purchase of a new house within
the panel and have data on portfolio shares both before and after this home purchase.12
Table 3b reports summary statistics for the sample we use in the panel analysis. Home-
owners in the panel sample generally have similar characteristics to those in the cross-sectional
sample, with three exceptions. First, they have less home equity and more mortgage debt, as
expected for new home buyers. Second, they are slightly less wealthy, consistent with being
younger on average. Finally, they hold more stocks in their portfolios. This is because the
panel sample spans 1996-2003, a period with higher stock ownership than the early 1990s.
4 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the impacts of property value and home equity using the following linear speci-
￿cation for portfolio shares:
stock sharei = const + ￿1property valuei + ￿2home equityi + ￿Xi + "i (4)
where Xi denotes a vector of controls, including components of total wealth such as liquid
wealth and income. The model in Section 2 predicts ￿1 < 0 and ￿2 > 0.13 The error term "
captures other sources of heterogeneity in portfolios. These may include entrepreneurial risk
(Heaton and Lucas 2000), investment mistakes (Odean 1999, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini
2007), heterogeneity in risk aversion ￿, or measurement error in income (Cocco 2005).
Some of the e⁄ects captured by the error term may be correlated with property value,
creating bias in OLS estimates of ￿1 and ￿2. For instance, Cocco (2005) emphasizes biases
due to unobserved labor income, which a⁄ects both the stock share and property value.
12When we include these households in the cross-sectional sample, we only use data from the ￿rst year in
which assets are observed. Hence, each observation in the cross-sectional sample is for a unique household.
13An alternative speci￿cation is to normalize the housing variables by liquid wealth. We show that our results
are robust to such a speci￿cation, but opt to use levels in our baseline model for two reasons. First, when
liquid wealth is imperfectly measured and close to zero for some observations, normalizing by it introduces
large outliers in the independent variables of interest. Second, our simulations show that one should ￿nd a
relationship between the stock share and levels of property value and home equity wealth.
14Suppose that Y1 = Y obs
1 +Y un
1 where only Y obs
1 is observed to the econometrician. Since higher
lifetime wealth generates higher stockholdings, " is positively related to Y un. If households
with higher future labor income own larger houses ￿as predicted by the model with persistent
uncertainty ￿property value is also positively related to Y un, and hence the OLS estimate of
￿1 is biased upward. Indeed, Cocco (2005, Table 6) runs cross-sectional OLS regressions using
simulated data from his model and ￿nds a positive e⁄ect of mortgage debt on stockholdings
caused by omitting future labor income from the regression. Such endogeneity problems
make it essential to isolate variation in property value and home equity that is orthogonal to
" in order to identify ￿1 and ￿2.
We divide our empirical analysis into four sections. First, we con￿rm that estimating
(4) using OLS in our data yields results that are similar to those of prior studies. We then
identify the causal impacts of mortgage debt and home equity wealth on portfolios by using
three di⁄erent research designs to estimate (4): variation in mean house prices, variation in
local housing supply constraints, and changes in portfolio shares around home purchase in
panel data.
4.1 OLS Estimates
Previous studies have estimated OLS regressions of portfolio shares on property values, mort-
gage debt, and home equity with various control vectors and obtained mixed results. To
ensure that the di⁄erences between our ￿ndings and theirs are not driven by di⁄erences in
data or sample de￿nitions, we begin by estimating similar speci￿cations in our sample.
Column 1 of Table 4 reports OLS estimates of a regression of the stock share of liquid
wealth on property value and home equity wealth without any covariates. Consistent with
the ￿ndings of Heaton and Lucas (2000), Cocco (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005), we ￿nd
that an increase in property value (mortgage debt) is positively associated with the stock
share of liquid wealth, contrary to the model￿ s predictions. This is presumably because
individuals with larger properties tend to be wealthier or face less background risk and these
omitted factors induce them to hold more stocks.
In column 2, we attempt to account for some of these factors by including controls for
household income and private business wealth; household head￿ s education, number of chil-
dren, and age; and a 10 piece linear spline in liquid wealth to control ￿ exibility for a house-
15hold￿ s level of wealth. The inclusion of these covariates reduces the coe¢ cient on property
value by approximately 80%, but it remains positive in sign.
In column 3, we exclude households with zero mortgage debt, who constitute 23% of
homeowners in the sample, as in Fratantoni (1998). This change in sample speci￿cation
makes the coe¢ cient on property value negative and statistically signi￿cant, consistent with
Fratantoni￿ s ￿ndings. Importantly, Fratantoni is not able to control for location as the SCF
does not contain geographic information. Once indicators for state of residence are included,
the negative correlation between property values and stock shares is no longer signi￿cant, as
shown in Column 4 of Table 4.
These OLS results echo the instability of estimates found in prior studies. Moreover,
they indicate that the endogeneity of housing choices is likely to bias the e⁄ect of property
value on stock shares upward. These ￿ndings call for research designs that isolate variation
in mortgage debt and home equity that is less correlated with unobserved determinants of
portfolios.
4.2 Research Design 1: Mean House Prices
Identi￿cation Strategy. Our ￿rst research design exploits two instruments to generate varia-
tion in home equity and property value: the average price of houses in the individual￿ s state in
the current year (the year in which portfolios are measured) and the average price of houses
in the individual￿ s state in the year that he bought his house. The intuition for this identi-
￿cation strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots average real home prices in California
from 1975-2005 using the OFHEO data. Consider a hypothetical experiment involving a set
of individuals who buy identical houses and only pay the interest on their mortgage (so that
debt outstanding does not change over time). As a baseline, consider individual A who buys
a house in 1985 (dashed red line) and whose portfolio we observe in 2000 (solid blue line), as
shown in Panel A.
Now compare this individual to individual B who buys the same house in 1990 and whose
portfolio we also observe in 2000. Individuals A and B have the same current property
value, but individual B is likely to have less home equity and a larger mortgage, because
home prices were higher in 1990 than 1985. Intuitively, since individual B is buying the
same house at a higher price, he needs a bigger mortgage; and because he enjoys less home
16price appreciation than A, he will end up with lower home equity in 2000. Now consider a
second experiment, comparing panel C to A. Individual C buys the same house in 1985, but
we observe his portfolio in 2005. This individual has the same mortgage debt as individual
A (under the assumption that individuals only pay interest to service their debt), but has
higher home equity and wealth at the time we observe his portfolio. Together, the two
experiments (instruments) allow us to separately identify the causal e⁄ects of mortgages and
home equity on portfolios.
In practice, our implementation of this strategy di⁄ers from the hypothetical examples
in two ways. First, we do not just compare individuals who buy at di⁄erent times, as such
comparisons may be contaminated by time series ￿ uctuations in asset prices or correlations
between portfolios and home tenure or age. Because we have data on individuals who
purchase houses in di⁄erent years and observe portfolios in di⁄erent years in 50 states, we
include state, current year, year of house purchase, and age ￿xed e⁄ects in every regression
speci￿cation below. Thus, we identify ￿1 and ￿2 in (4) purely from within-state changes in
house prices.14 Second, unlike in the hypothetical example, individuals buy smaller houses
when prices are high and reduce their mortgage debt over time by paying more than mortgage
interest. The ￿rst stage e⁄ects of the house price indices on mortgage and home equity
account for these e⁄ects.
The ￿rst three columns of Table 5 report ￿rst stage regressions of mortgage, home equity,
and property value (mortgage plus home equity) on the two instruments. These speci￿cations
include state, year of purchase, current year, and age ￿xed e⁄ects as covariates.15 These
￿rst-stage e⁄ects remain very similar when we include the following vector of ￿full controls,￿
which we use to evaluate robustness of each of our speci￿cations below: household income,
household head￿ s education, number of children, the state unemployment rate in the current
year, private business wealth, and a ten piece linear spline for liquid wealth.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that higher current house prices strongly predict higher prop-
erty values, with a t-statistic of 40. Conditioning on current prices, higher house prices at
the time of purchase predict slightly lower current property values, con￿rming that individ-
14Since the instruments only vary by state and year/year of purchase, one cannot include state￿year e⁄ects
(i.e. allow state e⁄ects to vary over time).
15By including both year of purchase and current year ￿xed e⁄ects, we control non-parametrically for home
tenure.
17uals purchase smaller houses if they buy at times when prices are relatively high. Column 2
shows that higher current prices strongly predict higher home equity, showing that much of
the increase in property value comes from higher home equity, as expected. Higher prices at
the time of purchase strongly predict lower home equity, with a t-statistic of 18. Conversely,
column 3 shows that higher prices at the time of purchase predict much larger mortgages.
Higher current prices also predict (to a smaller extent) larger mortgages, an e⁄ect that may
be driven by re￿nancing ￿ when current prices are high, individuals tap into their home
equity.16
The exclusion restriction for these instruments is that changes in average state house
prices are orthogonal to unobserved determinants of portfolio decisions ("). There are two
potential threats to the validity of this exclusion restriction. First, ￿ uctuations in state
housing markets could be correlated with ￿ uctuations in the local labor market or other
economic conditions, which might in turn directly in￿ uence portfolio choices. Second, the
exclusion restriction could be violated via selection e⁄ects. People who buy houses when
prices in their state are relatively high may have di⁄erent risk preferences from those who buy
when prices are lower. This could generate a spurious correlation between stock shares and
house price indices. We address these concerns below after presenting the baseline results.
2SLS Results. Columns 4-9 of Table 5 report two-stage least squares estimates of ￿1 and
￿2 in (4), where home equity and property value are instrumented using the two OFHEO
price indices. In column 4, we estimate the model including current year, year of purchase,
age, and state ￿xed e⁄ects. The null hypothesis that changes in property value have no
e⁄ect on ￿nancial portfolios is rejected with p < 0:01. The point estimate of the property
value coe¢ cient implies that a $10,000 increase in an individual￿ s mortgage debt reduces his
stock share of liquid wealth by 0.89 percentage points ($350). Given a mean stock share
in the analysis sample of 16.1%, this is equivalent to a 5.5% reduction in the stock share
of liquid wealth. This impact lies within the range of estimates implied by the numerical
simulations in Tables 1 and 2. The point estimate is closest to the prediction of the ￿xed
adjustment cost speci￿cation, which is perhaps the most plausible model. The elasticity of
16Re￿nancing does not a⁄ect our 2SLS estimates because it rescales both the ￿rst-stage and reduced-
form coe¢ cients by the same amount. Re￿nancing could a⁄ect liquid wealth; we account for this channel by
conditioning on liquid wealth using a ￿ exible spline in many of our speci￿cations. Note that in a heterogeneous
population, our IV strategy will estimate a local average treatment e⁄ect that applies to individuals who do
not fully re￿nance their mortgages when property values go up.
18the stock share of liquid wealth with respect to mortgage debt is approximately -0.3 at the
sample mean mortgage debt of $53,000.
The estimate of the home equity coe¢ cient in column 4 implies that a $10,000 increase
in home equity raises the stock share by 0.95 percentage points (5.9%) when total property
value is held ￿xed, which we interpret as a wealth e⁄ect. The mean home equity in the
sample is approximately $72,000, implying an elasticity of stock share of liquid wealth with
respect to home equity wealth of approximately 0.4.
Column 5 of Table 5 replicates column 4 with the ￿xed e⁄ects and the full set of covariates:
liquid wealth spline, private business wealth, education, income, number of children, and
the state unemployment rate. The estimate of the property value coe¢ cient is virtually
una⁄ected by controls, unlike the OLS estimates in Table 4. Since controlling for observables
has little impact on the estimate, one can be more con￿dent that biases due to omitted
unobservables are not driving these IV results.
To further interpret the magnitude of these e⁄ects, consider the following counterfactuals.
First, suppose households had the same level of home equity wealth but had their mortgage
debt obligations cancelled. The estimates from column 5 imply that the stock share of
portfolios would be 0:52890￿7:78 = 4:1 percentage points higher in this scenario. This is a
27% increase relative to the mean stock share of 16.1%. Second, suppose households had no
mortgage debt and no home equity wealth. The net impact of having no housing wealth or
liabilities on the stock share of liquid wealth would be ￿7:78￿1:25154+6:22￿0:72301 = ￿5:23
percentage points, a 32% reduction.
Because property value is the sum of mortgage debt and home equity, our estimates for ￿1
and ￿2 imply that an increase in home equity holding ￿xed mortgage debt has no signi￿cant
e⁄ect on portfolio allocations. This is because the wealth e⁄ect of having more home equity
is cancelled out by the e⁄ect of owning a more expensive house. It is therefore crucial to
disentangle the two components of property value in order to uncover the e⁄ects of housing
on portfolios. It follows that the demand for risky assets will not covary with current house
price ￿ uctuations (because they a⁄ect both wealth and property values simultaneously), but
will covary negatively with outstanding mortgage debt.
Robustness Checks. In columns 6-8 of Table 5, we evaluate the robustness of our esti-
mates to alternative speci￿cations and sample de￿nitions. In column 6, we estimate a model
19analogous to column 4 using logs instead of levels for the independent variables. We instru-
ment for log(property value) and log(home equity) with the logs of the two OFHEO price
indices. We retain the stock share in levels on the left hand side because of the large number
of individuals with 0 stock shares in our sample. Consistent with the previous results, the
estimates reveal that increases in property value signi￿cantly reduce the share of stocks in
liquid wealth, and increases in home equity wealth increase stock shares.
Column 7 reports estimates from a speci￿cation analogous to column 5 except the endoge-
nous regressors are also de￿ned as shares of liquid wealth, like the dependent variable. We
replace property value by the ratio of property value to liquid wealth and home equity by the
ratio of home equity to liquid wealth. We then use the level of the two OFHEO price indices
as in column 4 as instruments for these ratios. This speci￿cation e⁄ectively tests whether
households with a large amount of mortgage debt to liquid wealth hold safer portfolios using
a di⁄erent functional form to account for variation in wealth. One problem with this speci￿-
cation is that we introduce substantial outliers, as there are many observations with near-zero
liquid wealth. To reduce noise from these outliers, we exclude observations with ratios of
property value or home equity to liquid wealth above 20. The estimates are consistent with
those obtained previously, but less precisely estimated because of the instability of the ratios.
In column 8, we replicate the levels speci￿cation with the controls in column 5, but restrict
the sample to individuals with more than $100,000 of total wealth. The objective of this
speci￿cation is to assess whether the e⁄ects we have identi￿ed are also present among high-
wealth households, whose behavior may be most relevant for ￿nancial market aggregates.
The point estimate of the property value and home equity coe¢ cients are slightly larger in
magnitude than those in the full sample. Housing remains an important determinant of
portfolio choice even for wealthier households.
Extensive and Intensive Margin Response. In columns 9 and 10, we decompose the e⁄ects
of housing on stock shares into stock market participation decisions (whether to own any
stocks) and intensive margin changes in portfolio allocations (how much money to invest in
stocks conditional on owning stocks). Column 9 replicates column 5, replacing the dependent
variable with an indicator for owning stocks. A $10,000 increase in an individual￿ s mortgage
is estimated to reduce his probability of owning stocks by 1.4 percentage points, relative to a
mean of 29%. Conversely, increases in home equity wealth increase the probability of stock
20market participation by a similar magnitude.
Column 10 isolates the intensive margin response ￿the change in stock shares conditional
on participating in the stock market. This column reports estimates of a two-stage Tobit
speci￿cation. This model is analogous to the two-stage-least-squares estimates, but corrects
for the fact that some individuals are non-participants using a Tobit speci￿cation where the
stock share is left censored at 0.17 The estimates imply that a $10,000 increase in mortgage
debt reduces stock shares for stock market participants by 3.1 percentage points relative to
a base of 55%. Home equity changes again have similar e⁄ects in the opposite direction.
Threats to Identi￿cation. We now return to the two threats to identi￿cation discussed
in the previous subsection. In order to evaluate these concerns, it is useful to understand
the reduced-form relationships underlying the two-stage-least-squares estimates above. Two
reduced-form relationships drive the 2SLS results in Tables 3. First, individuals who buy
houses when housing prices are relatively high in their state hold less stocks in subsequent
years. Second, homeowners￿stock shares do not vary substantially with contemporaneous
housing prices. The ￿rst ￿nding tells us that households with higher mortgage debt and
lower home equity have lower stock shares. To determine which channel is responsible for the
reduction in stockholding, we use the second ￿nding, which shows that ￿ uctuations in home
equity have no e⁄ect on stock shares. This leads us to conclude that increases in mortgage
debt reduce stockholding, as shown in Tables 3.
The ￿rst threat to a causal interpretation of the two reduced-form relationships is that
￿ uctuations in current home prices are correlated with portfolios through omitted variables.
For instance, house prices may be related to local economic conditions that directly a⁄ect
portfolio choice. We believe that such e⁄ects are unlikely to be responsible for our ￿ndings
for two reasons. First, controlling for observable measures of the local business cycle by using
state unemployment rates and current household income has little e⁄ect on the estimates.
Second, any remaining omitted variables (e.g. expectations of future labor income) are likely
to bias the estimated e⁄ect of current house prices on stock shares upward. If individuals are
unobservably wealthier when house prices are high in their area, their stock shares should rise
because higher income individuals tend to hold more stocks. This would work against our
17Estimating a 2SLS model only on the subsample of stock market participants yields biased estimates
because changes in home equity and mortgages a⁄ect stock market participation rates, generating selection
e⁄ects.
21second reduced-form result that ￿ uctuations in property value have no e⁄ect on portfolios.
The second threat to identi￿cation is that ￿ uctuations in house prices at the time of
purchase are correlated with portfolios because of selection e⁄ects. Individuals who buy
houses when house prices are relatively high may have di⁄erent risk preferences. We believe
that such selection bias is modest in our setting for the same two reasons. Controlling for
observables has little impact on the estimates, indicating that selection on observables is
minimal. And again, we expect such selection biases to work against our ￿ndings: those
who are willing to buy a house when prices are relatively high are presumably less risk
averse (Shore and Sinai 2010). This would work against our ￿rst reduced form ￿nding that
individuals who buy when prices are high (and thus have more mortgage debt) have safer
portfolios.
While these arguments suggest that the results in Table 5 are unlikely to be driven
by omitted variable and selection biases, they are not conclusive. We therefore turn to
two alternative identi￿cation strategies that directly overcome these problems using di⁄erent
sources of variation.
4.3 Research Design 2: Variation in Housing Supply Elasticities
Identi￿cation Strategy. Our second research design exploits national house prices interacted
with local housing supply elasticities to generate variation in home equity and property value.
To understand the intuition for this strategy, consider two states, one with an inelastic housing
supply (e.g. California) and another with highly elastic housing supply (e.g. Kansas). When
there is an aggregate demand shock for housing at the national level, there is very little
adjustment in the supply of housing in California, so prices covary strongly with the national
prices. However, in Kansas, most of the adjustment takes place on the supply margin and
local house prices are much more stable. More generally, aggregate demand shocks for
housing (which we measure using national house prices) have larger impacts on house prices
in states with low housing supply elasticities, generating di⁄erential variation in house prices
across states (Mian and Su￿2011). The advantage of this source of variation is that it avoids
the potential for omitted variable bias due to local economic shocks because the variation is
driven purely by national demand shocks.
To implement this strategy, we instrument for mortgage debt and home equity with
22current and year-of-purchase national house prices interacted with the state housing supply
elasticity. The housing supply elasticity is taken from Saiz (2010), who constructs predicted
elasticities using measures of local physical and regulatory constraints. Including year ￿xed
e⁄ects and state ￿xed e⁄ects in the regressions absorbs the level e⁄ects of the national prices
and the state housing supply elasticity. Therefore, our instruments are simply the two
interaction e⁄ects.
Columns 1-3 of Table 6 report ￿rst stage regressions of property value, home equity, and
mortgage debt on these two instruments. The speci￿cations in columns 1-3 include state,
year of purchase, current year, and age ￿xed e⁄ects as covariates. As above, the ￿rst-stage
estimates are una⁄ected by the inclusion of additional controls. Column 1 shows that higher
national prices in the current year have signi￿cantly smaller e⁄ects on property values in
states with highly elastic housing supply. Column 2 shows that higher national prices also
have smaller e⁄ects on home equity in more elastic housing markets, as expected. Higher
national prices at the time of purchase reduce home equity by a smaller amount in areas
with elastic housing supply. Conversely, column 3 shows that higher prices at the time of
purchase have smaller impacts on mortgage debt in elastic markets. All of these ￿rst-stage
e⁄ects are highly signi￿cant, although the t statistics are somewhat smaller than in the ￿rst
research design because this strategy exploits a narrower source of variation.
2SLS Results. Columns 4-6 of Table 6 report two-stage least squares estimates of ￿1 and
￿2 in (4), where home equity and property value are instrumented using the two national price
indices interacted with state housing supply elasticity. In column 4, we estimate the model
including current year, year of purchase, age, and state ￿xed e⁄ects. The point estimate
of the property value coe¢ cient implies that a $10,000 increase in an individual￿ s mortgage
reduces his stock share of liquid wealth by 1.2 percentage points. A $10,000 increase in home
equity increases his stock share by 1.4 percentage points. Both estimates are statistically
signi￿cant with p < 0:01. Column 5 of Table 6 replicates column 3 with the full set of
covariates in addition to the ￿xed e⁄ects. Including the full set of controls does not have a
statistically signi￿cant impact on the coe¢ cient estimates. The magnitudes of the coe¢ cients
are quite similar to the corresponding coe¢ cients in column 5 of Table 5, although slightly
less precisely estimated because the ￿rst-stage has less power. Column 6 replicates column 5,
replacing the dependent variable with an indicator for owning stocks to estimate the extensive
23margin response. A $10,000 increase in an individual￿ s mortgage is estimated to reduce his
probability of participating in the stock market by 1.6 percentage points. Increases in home
equity wealth increase the probability of stock market participation by a slightly smaller
magnitude. These estimates are again fairly similar to those in Table 5, giving us greater
con￿dence that our estimates are not signi￿cantly biased by omitted variables.
4.4 Research Design 3: Portfolio Changes Around Home Purchase
Identi￿cation Strategy. Our third identi￿cation strategy directly addresses concerns about
selection by examining changes in portfolio shares within a household. Do individuals who
buy more expensive houses reduce their stockholdings by a larger amount from the year
before to the year after home purchase? We answer this question using the small subsample
of households for whom we (1) observe a home purchase within our data and (2) observe
portfolio shares both before and after home purchase. Note that this sample includes both
individuals who transition from renting to owning and individuals who bought a new house
within our sample frame. As discussed in Section 3, this panel sample includes much fewer
households than the cross-sectional analysis sample because the SIPP tracks households for
only 3 years and relatively few households buy a house within that window.
De￿ne ￿x = xt+1 ￿xt￿1 for an individual who buys a new house in year t. We estimate
(4) in ￿rst di⁄erences:
￿stock sharei = ￿ + ￿1￿property valuei + ￿2￿total wealthi + ￿￿Xi + ￿"i (5)
This estimation strategy complements the preceding research designs by addressing selection
directly. If our results are driven by selection e⁄ects, individuals who buy houses when prices
are high would hold more conservative portfolios even before they buy their houses and we
would not ￿nd ￿1 < 0 in (5).
To account for the endogeneity of the size of the house one purchases, we instrument for
￿property value using the state house price index in the year of home purchase. Columns
1-3 of Table 7 document the ￿rst-stage e⁄ects of the state house price index on changes in
property value, home equity, and mortgage debt in a regression that includes state and age
￿xed e⁄ects as well a control for the change in total wealth. To reduce the in￿ uence of
24outliers, we exclude 62 households who report changes in total wealth of more than 1 million
dollars in these speci￿cations; we show below that this exclusion has no e⁄ect on our estimate
of ￿1 but does a⁄ect the estimated wealth e⁄ects. The estimates show that individuals who
buy houses in higher priced markets spend more on their houses. Most of the increase comes
from taking on more mortgage debt rather than making a bigger downpayment to build home
equity.
Because we only observe portfolio shares over two to three years, there is little di⁄erence
between house prices at the time of purchase and the point at which we observe portfolio
shares. Therefore, we cannot separately instrument for the e⁄ects of changes in wealth (via
home equity) on portfolios as in the preceding cross-sectional speci￿cations. Instead, we
control for the change in total wealth in (5) directly. To the extent that this approach fails
to adjust adequately for the impacts of changes in wealth, our estimate of ￿1 in the panel
design will be biased toward zero because it captures not only the impacts of having more
mortgage debt but also the impacts of having more wealth.
In practice, we ￿nd that controlling for the change in wealth has little impact on our
estimate of ￿1 because local house prices are not strongly correlated with changes in total
wealth from the year before to the year after purchase. Intuitively, an individual who buys
a house in more expensive market ends up with less liquid wealth but similar total wealth
after the house purchase. As a result, the IV estimate of ￿1 in (5) is e⁄ectively identi￿ed
from changes in property value that are orthogonal to changes in total wealth. Therefore,
we expect the estimates of ￿1 from this design to be fairly comparable to the cross-sectional
estimates of the impacts of mortgage debt on stockholding.
2SLS Results. Columns 4-6 report 2SLS estimates of the e⁄ect of changes in property
value on the stock share of liquid wealth. In column 4, we include state, age, and year
￿xed e⁄ects and the change in total wealth as controls. A $10,000 increase in property
value is estimated to reduce the stock share by 0.9 percentage points in this speci￿cation.
This estimate is statistically signi￿cant with p < 0:01. A $10,000 increase in wealth is
estimated to increase stock shares by 0.6 percentage points. Reassuringly, this estimate is
quite similar to the estimated impacts of home equity wealth on the stock share from our
￿rst two identi￿cation strategies.
Column 5 shows that controlling for education, number of children, state unemployment
25rate, and the change in household income does not a⁄ect the results signi￿cantly. Column
6 shows that the estimated impact of changes in property value on the stock share of liquid
wealth remains unchanged when the outliers with wealth changes of more than 1 million
dollars are included. Not surprisingly, however, these outliers substantially attenuate the es-
timated e⁄ect of wealth on portfolio shares. Finally, column 7 replicates column 5, replacing
the dependent variable with an indicator for owning stocks. A $10,000 increase in an indi-
vidual￿ s mortgage is estimated to reduce his probability of owning stocks by 0.7 percentage
points relative to a baseline stock ownership rate of 38% in this sample.
The panel analysis con￿rms that the di⁄erence in portfolios between individuals who
buy when house prices are high and low emerges immediately after home purchase, directly
addressing concerns about selection bias. The similarity of the estimates from the three
research designs indicates that mortgage debt has a robust negative e⁄ect on risk taking in
￿nancial portfolios over both short and long horizons.
5 Conclusion
This paper has characterized the causal e⁄ect of housing on portfolio choice. We ￿nd that
an increase in mortgage debt, holding wealth ￿xed, reduces a household￿ s propensity to
participate in the stock market and reduces the share of stocks in the portfolio conditional on
participation. The estimated elasticity of the share of liquid wealth allocated to stocks with
respect to mortgage debt is -0.3. Increases in home equity wealth while holding property
value ￿xed increase stockholding. The estimated elasticity of the stock share of liquid wealth
with respect to home equity is 0.4. On net, our estimates imply that stock shares of liquid
wealth would be 5 percentage points ($2,000 or 32%) higher in an economy without housing
(no mortgage debt and no home equity wealth).
Our empirical results suggest that the interaction between housing and ￿nancial markets
could have important consequences for the macroeconomy. In the recent past, there have
been three rapid changes in housing markets: a substantial increase in mortgage debt, a
rapid decline in property values, and a substantial increase in the illiquidity of housing as
many individuals postpone selling their homes. Our empirical evidence suggests that each
of these factors induces households to withdraw funds from the stock market. Hence, recent
changes in the housing market could potentially have reduced the demand for risky assets
26and exacerbated the decline in ￿nancial markets. In future work, it would be interesting to
explore whether such interactions are consistent with historical ￿ uctuations in housing and
asset prices using calibrated general equilibrium models.
Our analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that the illiquidity of housing ampli￿es
household risk aversion. An interesting avenue for future research would be to explore
whether ￿ uctuations in the liquidity of housing markets over time induce changes in ￿nancial
portfolios. It is also important to analyze whether the commitment of having to make
mortgage payments ￿a ￿cash commitment￿that arises from liquidity constraints ￿or the
commitment of being unable to adjust housing consumption easily is what ampli￿es risk
aversion.18 Depending upon which mechanism is more important, reducing transaction
costs in the housing and mortgage markets could raise welfare both directly and by allowing
households to bear more risk in their ￿nancial portfolios.
18Such an analysis would require variation in mortgage payments that is orthogonal to property value,
perhaps arising from di⁄erences in the term structure of loans.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let W1 = L0 (1 + Rp) + P1H0 ￿ M1 + Y1. If the household can
move, the optimal consumption bundle satis￿es C1 = (1 ￿ ￿)W1 and P1H1 = ￿W1, implying
that utility in this state is
Vm (W1) =
h












If the household cannot move, the consumption bundle is C1 = W1 ￿ P1H0 and H1 = H0,






￿ (W1 ￿ P1H0)
(1￿￿)(1￿￿) : (7)
We then de￿ne V (W) = Vm (W) if the household moves and Vnm (W) otherwise. The ￿rst
order condition of the problem implies
E
￿
(R ￿ Rf) ￿ V 0 (W1)
￿
= 0:
We can write this as
￿ ￿ E
￿
(1 + R) ￿ V 0
nm (W1)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E
￿
(1 + R) ￿ V 0
m (W1)
￿
= ￿ ￿ E
￿
(1 + Rf) ￿ V 0
nm (W1)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ E
￿
(1 + Rf) ￿ V 0
m (W1)
￿
where both sides are positive. To log-linearize each side separately, ￿rst introduce the notation
that V 00
nm and V 00
m are the marginal utilities in the two states assuming that the agent has a




without risk. Now take logs of the left hand
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:
The log-linearization is around the point when the agent holds no stocks and is exposed
to no home price risk. An analogous formula holds for the right hand side, with the same
constants. Using the approximation logE exp(z) ￿ Ez + ￿2
z=2 which is exact when z is a
normal random variable, we then obtain
Er ￿ rf +
￿2
2










as in the text. To compute ￿￿, denote by W0
1 wealth in t = 1 assuming a safe portfolio and
that the home price equals P0











































which imply, after some calculations, equation (3) in the text.
Now note that V 0
nm (W1) is proportional to (L0 (1 + Rp) + Y1 ￿ M1)
￿￿￿￿+￿￿. Let L0 (1 + Rp)+
Y1 ￿ M1 = L1, which we can loglinearize as
l1 ￿ k + ￿1 (l + rp) + ￿2 (y + rf) + (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2)(m + rf)




L + Y ￿ M
and ￿2 =
Y
L + Y ￿ M
:
V 0




1 . We can loglinearize W1 = L0 (1 + Rp)+P1H0+
Y1 ￿ M1 as
w1 ￿ k0 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 (l + rp) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿2 (y + rf) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2)(m + rf) + ￿p1
where k0 is a di⁄erent constant and ￿ = PH=(L + PH + Y ￿ M) is the housing share in
wealth W.
29Substituting these expressions into V 0
nm (W1) and V 0
m (W1) and then in the Euler equation
yields
Er ￿ rf +
￿2
2
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿
￿





Er ￿ rf + ￿2=2 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿￿)cov[r;p1]
￿￿￿c ￿ ￿2￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿2￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
which gives (3) as desired.
Numerical solution. We use the same numerical techniques as Cocco (2005) to solve
the model. The idea is use backward induction and compute continuation values over
grids. We approximate the state and choice variables using equal-spaced grids, and the
probability density functions of shocks with three-point Gaussian quadratures. In the static
speci￿cations, both with random moves and ￿xed costs, and with and without labor income
risk, we compute realized utility over each gridpoint in the state space and then expected
utility using numerical integration for each choice of ￿. To compute utilities for points which
do no lie on the grid, we use cubic spline interpolation. In the dynamic model, we perform
the same exercise in the last period for each choice of consumption and portfolio, and use the
resulting optimal continuation values to solve for the optimal portfolio in the initial period.
Using a seven-point Gaussian quadrature does not alter the results.
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33Panel A: Impacts of property value on stock share of liquid wealth
 
$105,000 $115,000 $125,000 $135,000 $145,000
0.55 0 79.0% 72.9% 66.5% 60.1% 53.8%
0.55 0.1 78.2% 72.1% 66.0% 59.7% 53.6%
0.35 0 82.6% 76.4% 69.6% 62.6% 55.4%
0.35 0.1 80.9% 74.9% 68.5% 61.7% 54.9%
00 95.1% 93.4% 91.7% 89.7% 87.7%
0 0.1 90.7% 88.2% 85.6% 82.9% 80.3%
Panel B: Impacts of home equity wealth on stock share of liquid wealth
 
$52,000 $62,000 $72,000 $82,000 $92,000
0.55 0 54.4% 60.4% 66.5% 72.7% 78.7%
0.55 0.1 54.0% 60.0% 66.0% 71.9% 77.8%
0.35 0 56.5% 63.1% 69.6% 76.1% 82.5%
0.35 0.1 55.7% 62.1% 68.5% 74.7% 80.9%
00 82.0% 86.9% 91.7% 96.5% 100.0%
0 0.1 75.7% 80.7% 85.6% 90.6% 95.5%
Notes: Each cell lists the optimal share of liquid wealth invested in stocks (*) for a different 
combination of parameters.  denotes the probability that the household does not move and 
measures the strength of housing commitments.  denotes the correlation coefficient between 
the (log) stock return and (log) home price growth, and measures the degree of home price 
risk.
TABLE 1
Simulation Results from Stylized Model
Property Value
Home Equity 
$105,000 $115,000 $125,000 $135,000 $145,000
0.2 0 84.9% 82.6% 82.8% 82.7% 79.4%
0.2 0.1 82.6% 79.0% 78.7% 78.3% 73.8%
0.1 0 91.0% 90.6% 88.0% 85.9% 83.6%
0.1 0.1 87.5% 85.6% 82.8% 79.9% 77.0%
$52,000 $62,000 $72,000 $82,000 $92,000
0.2 0 75.8% 79.5% 82.8% 89.2% 89.4%
0.2 0.1 70.0% 75.2% 78.7% 85.5% 85.5%
0.1 0 78.4% 83.3% 88.0% 92.6% 98.1%
0.1 0.1 72.9% 77.8% 82.8% 87.6% 92.6%
 
$105,000 $115,000 $125,000 $135,000 $145,000
0.55 0.1 96.0% 87.0% 68.0% 51.0% 41.0%
$52,000 $62,000 $72,000 $82,000 $92,000
0.55 0.1 42.0% 52.0% 68.0% 87.0% 96.0%
 
$105,000 $115,000 $125,000 $135,000 $145,000
0.55 0.1 55.7% 49.1% 42.6% 36.4% 30.4%
$52,000 $62,000 $72,000 $82,000 $92,000




Panel C: Labor Income Risk
Home Value
Home Equity
Notes: Each cell lists the optimal share of liquid wealth invested in stocks (*) for a different 
combination of parameters in alternative models. In Panel A,  is the share of home value that 
must be paid as a fixed cost when moving. In panels B and C,  denotes the probability that 
the household does not move. Both of these parameters measure the strength of housing 
commitments.  denotes the correlation coefficient between the (log) stock return and (log) 
home price growth, and measures the degree of home price risk.
TABLE 2
Simulation Results from Alternative Models
Panel A: Fixed Adjustment Costs
Home Value





Age (years) 47.70 46 13.88
Years of education 13.64 13 2.76
Number of children 0.64 0 1.02
Household Income ($) 48,320 39,934 41,552
Housing:
Property value ($) 125,154 99,664 91,035
Mortgage ($) 52,890 43,035 51,490
Home tenure (years) 8.44 7 6.66
Wealth:
Total wealth ($) 173,229 94,760 588,425
Liquid wealth ($) 39,686 5,600 543,805
Home equity ($) 72,301 48,895 73,901
Equity in other real estate ($) 15,925 0 66,740
Vehicle equity ($) 6,700 5,206 7,777
Business equity ($) 11,381 0 71,873
Retirement accounts ($) 22,250 0 51,158
Portfolio Allocation:
Percent of households holding stock 29.46% 0.00% 45.59%
Stock share (% of liquid wealth) 16.11% 0.00% 30.49%
Safe assets share (% of liquid wealth) 83.89% 100.0% 30.49%
Number of observations
TABLE 3a
Summary Statistics for SIPP Cross Sectional Anaysis Sample
64,191
Notes: This table includes all household heads (reference persons) in the 1990-2001 SIPP panels who 
purchased houses in or after 1975 and for whom house price index information is available, which is the 
estimation sample for the cross-sectional analysis.  All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.  Home 
tenure is defined as numbers of years living in current house.  Income is total family income: labor 
income plus all other forms of income plus transfers.  Total wealth is gross household wealth measured 
on the survey.  It includes financial assets as well as all real estate (including second homes), cars, and 
private business equity.  Debts are not subtracted from the total wealth measure.  Safe assets consist of 
bonds, checking accounts, and savings accounts.  Liquid wealth is defined as the the sum of safe 





Age (years) 43.13 40 13.49
Years of education 14.02 13 2.60
Number of children 0.99 1 1.15
Household Income ($) 53,971 43,409 48,460
Housing:
Property value ($) 134,979 109,832 98,184
Mortgage ($) 79,008 70,606 61,078
Home tenure (years) 1.34 1.00 0.47
Wealth:
Total wealth ($) 148,611 69,008 275,019
Liquid wealth ($) 43,745 5,683 177,950
Home equity ($) 56,310 32,074 74,715
Equity in other real estate ($) 12,384 0 55,905
Vehicle equity ($) 5,809 4,558 7,982
Business equity ($) 10,199 0 84,641
Retirement accounts ($) 17,371 0 44,149
Portfolio Allocation:
Percent of households holding stock 37.84% 0.00% 48.50%
Stock share (% of liquid wealth) 23.44% 0.00% 35.62%
Safe assets share (% of liquid wealth) 76.56% 100.0% 35.62%
Number of observations
TABLE 3b
Summary Statistics for SIPP Panel Analysis Sample
6,150
Notes: This table includes the subset of household heads in the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels for whom 
we observe wealth both before and after the year of home purchase, which is the estimation sample for 
the panel analysis.   All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.  Home tenure is defined as numbers of 
years living in current house.  Income is total family income: labor income plus all other forms of income 
plus transfers.  Total wealth is gross household wealth measured on the survey.  It includes financial 
assets as well as all real estate (including second homes), cars, and private business equity.  Debts are 
not subtracted from the total wealth measure.  Safe assets consist of bonds, checking accounts, and 
savings accounts.  Liquid wealth is defined as the the sum of safe assets and stockholdings.Dependent Variable:
(%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property value 4.78 0.80 -0.61 -0.15
  (x $100K) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.28)
Home equity 0.77 -1.97 -0.80 -0.93
  (x $100K) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (0.36)
current year, purch. x x x
 year and age FE's
state FE's x x
liquid wealth spline x x x
other controls x x x




Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications 2-4 include fixed effects for the 
household head's age, current year (year in which portfolio allocations and current property 
value are measured), and year of home purchase. These specifications also include a 10-
piece linear spline for liquid wealth, and the following other controls: income, private 
business wealth, education, number of children, and state unemployment rate in current year 
as well as year of home purchase. Specifications 2 and 4 include state fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is dollars held in stocks divided by liquid wealth. All specifications are 
estimated using OLS.Two-step Tobit
Dependent Variable:  Prop Val Home Equity Mortgage Stockkholder Stock Share
Logs Shares High-Wlth
($) ($) ($) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Property value -8.94 -7.78 -13.70 -13.89 -30.66
  (x $100K) (3.10) (2.71) (5.12) (3.88) (8.89)
Home equity 9.48 6.22 14.18 10.86 29.18
  (x $100K) (3.55) (3.08) (6.26) (4.42) (9.99)
Log property value -44.27
  (x $100K) (16.86)
Log home equity 19.79
  (x $100K) (8.67)
Property val/iq wealth -7.62
  (x $100K) (3.45)
Home eq/liq wealth 7.07
  (x $100K) (3.53)
OFHEO state house price 377.1 329.5 47.66
  index in current year (9.46) (7.96) (5.19)
[39.86] [41.41] [9.18]
OFHEO state house price -56.45 -183.0 126.5
  index in year of purchase (12.23) (10.28) (6.71)
[4.62] [17.8] [18.85]
state, curr. year, purch. x x x x x x x x x x
  year and age FE's
other controls x x x x x x
Observations 64,124 64,124 64,124 64,124 63,594 63,594 33,105 30,670 63,594 63,594
TABLE 5
Research Design 1: Variation in State  House Prices
Stock Share
First Stage (OLS)
value to liquid wealth and the ratio of home equity to liquid wealth; households for whom either of these ratios exceed 20 are excluded in this specification.  Specification 8 restricts the 
sample to individuals with total wealth above $100,000. Coefficients for specifications 4-5 and 8-10 can be interpreted as percentage point effect of a $100,000 change in property value 
and home equity.
Two-Stage Least Squares
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and t-statistics in square brackets.  All specifications include fixed effects for the household head's state of residence, age, current year (year in 
which portfolio allocations and current property value are measured), and year of home purchase. Specifications 5-10 include these fixed effects, a 10-piece linear spline for liquid wealth, 
and the following other controls: income, private business wealth, education, number of children, and state unemployment rate in current year as well as year of home purchase.  In 
columns 1, the dependent variable is property value in the current year; in 2, it is home equity in the current year; and in 3, it is total outstanding mortgage debt in the current year. The 
dependent variable in specifications 4-8 and 10 is dollars held in stocks divided by liquid wealth. The dependent variable in specification 9 is an indicator for holding stocks.  Specifications 1-
3 are estimated using OLS; 4-9 are estimated using two-stage least squares; and 10 is estimated as a Tobit model with endogenous regressors using Newey's two-step estimator.  
Instruments for property value and home equity are the current-year and year of purchase OFHEO state price indices in specification 4-5 and 7-9.  In specification 6, we instrument for the 
logs of these variables with the  logs of the price indices.  In specification 6, the endogenous regressors are in logs. In specification 7, the endogenous regressors are the ratio of property Dependent Variable:  Prop Val Home Eq Mortg Stock Holder
($) ($) ($) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing Supply Elasticity x  -182.2 -166.1 -16.13
U.S. OFHEO in current year (6.60) (5.56) (3.61)
[27.59] [29.86] [4.47]
Housing Supply Elasticity x  17.70 73.75 -56.06
U.S. OFHEO in year of purch. (7.28) (6.13) (3.98)
[2.43] [12.03] [14.09]
Property value -11.68 -8.18 -16.09
  (x $100K) (4.05) (3.44) (4.95)
Home Equity 13.88 7.57 13.71
  (x $100K) (0.05) (0.04) (5.99)
state, age, year FE's x x x x x x
other controls x x
Observations 63,906 63,906 63,906 63,906 63,393 63,393
a 10-piece linear spline for liquid wealth, and the following other controls: income, private business 
wealth, education, number of children, and state unemployment rate in the current year.   Coefficients in 
columns 4-6 can be interpreted as percentage point effect of a $100,000 change in property value and 
home equity.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and t-statistics in square brackets.  The housing supply elasticity 
is from Saiz (2010, Table 6), who constructs predicted elasticity measures by MSA and state using 
measures of land availability and usage regulations.  We measure national house prices in our sample 
using the mean of the OFHEO index in each year.  Specifications 1-3 report OLS estimates of the first-
stage effect of the housing supply elasticity interacted with national house prices in the current year and 
the year of purchase.  The dependent variables are property value, home equity, and mortgage debt in 
the current year.  Specifications 4-6 report 2SLS estimates using the two interactions of the housing 
supply elasticity with national prices as instruments for property value and home equity.  The dependent 
variable in specifications 4-5 is dollars held in stocks divided by liquid wealth. The dependent variable in 
specification 6 is an indicator for holding stocks.  All specifications include fixed effects for the household 
head's state of residence, age, current year (year in which portfolio allocations and current property 
value are measured), and year of home purchase. Specification 5-6 include these fixed effects, 
Stock Share 
TABLE 6
Research Design 2: Variation in Housing Supply
First Stage (OLS)      Two-Stage Least Squares     Dependent Variable: 
 Prop Val Home Eq  Mortg
 Stock-
holder 
($) ($) ($) (%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OFHEO state house price 479.86 82.32 387.93
  index in year of purchase (43.37) (31.60) (32.32)
[11.06] [2.6] [12]
 Property value -9.17 -9.53 -8.31 -7.01
  (x $100K) (3.82) (3.92) (3.78) (4.84)
 total wealth 0.21 0.22 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
 total wealth 5.86 5.87 0.73 5.11
  (x $100K) (0.86) (0.87) (0.08) (1.07)
state, age, year FE's x x x x x x x
other controls x x x
Observations 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,993 6,055 5,993
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and t-statistics in square brackets. Specifications 1-3 report OLS 
estimates of the first-stage effect of the house price index in the year of purchase on the change in 
property value, home equity, and mortgage debt from the year before to the year after home purchase. 
Specifications 4-6 report 2SLS estimates of the effect of changes in property value and total wealth on 
changes in the stock share of liquid wealth using this instrument. The dependent variable in specification 
7 is an indicator for holding stocks.  All specifications include fixed effects for state of residence and age 
and also control for the change in total wealth from the year before to the year after home purchase.  
Specifications 5-7 also include the following other controls: change in income from year before to year 
after home purchase as well as education, number of children, and the state unemployment rate.  All 
specifications except 6 omit 62 households whose reported wealth changed by more than 1 million 
dollars in magnitude to reduce the influence of outliers.
 Stock Share
TABLE 7
Research Design 3: Portfolio Changes around Home Purchase





Age (years) 49.09 47 16.97
Years of education 12.69 12 3.07
Number of children 0.55 0 1.00
Household Income ($) 34,275 25,852 34,238
Housing:
Property value ($) 69,718 48,315 87,466
Mortgage ($) 25,681 0.00 43,537
Home tenure (years) 14.93 10 13.80
Wealth:
Total wealth ($) 108,394 42,990 430,748
Liquid wealth ($) 25,675 1,809 390,063
Home equity ($) 45,090 19,372 67,686
Equity in other real estate ($) 10,128 0.00 52,477
Vehicle equity ($) 4,908 3,174 6,779
Business equity ($) 6,940 0.00 55,171
Retirement accounts ($) 12,434 0.00 38,180
Portfolio Allocation:
Percent of households holding stock 19.17% 0.00% 39.36%
Stock share (% of liquid wealth) 12.63% 0.00% 28.40%
Safe assets share (% of liquid wealth) 87.37% 100.00% 28.40%
Number of observations
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for SIPP Full Sample
Notes: This table includes all household heads (reference persons) in the 1990-2001 SIPP panels.   All 
monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.  Home tenure is defined as numbers of years living in current 
house.  Income is total family income: labor income plus all other forms of income plus transfers.  Total 
wealth is gross household wealth measured on the survey.  It includes financial assets as well as all real 
estate (including second homes), cars, and private business equity.  Debts are not subtracted from the 
total wealth measure.  Safe assets consist of bonds, checking accounts, and savings accounts.  Liquid 
wealth is defined as the the sum of safe assets and stockholdings.
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(c) Higher home equity, same mortgage
NOTE–This figure illustrates the concept underlying our identification strategies by plotting the OFHEO real housing price
index in California from 1975 to 2005. Panel A depicts an individual who buys a house in 1985 and whose portfolio is
observed in 2000. Panel B shows an individual who buys the same house in 1990 instead of 1985, and has approximately
$100,000 more mortgage debt when observed in 2000 as a result. Panel C shows an individual who buys in 1985 and is
observed in 2005. This individual has approximately $175,000 more home equity than individual A.